THE CAREER OF MUHAMMAD BARKATULLAH (1864-1927): FROM INTELLECTUAL TO ANTICOLONIAL REVOLUTIONARY by Siddiqui, Samee
THE CAREER OF MUHAMMAD BARKATULLAH (1864-1927): FROM INTELLECTUAL 
TO ANTICOLONIAL REVOLUTIONARY 
Samee Nasim Siddiqui 
A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel hill in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in the Department of History in 
the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. 
Chapel Hill 
2017 
Approved by: 
Cemil Aydin 
Susan B. Pennybacker 
Iqbal Sevea 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2017  
Samee Nasim Siddiqui 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
Samee Nasim Siddiqui: The Career of Muhammad Barkatullah (1864-1927): From Intellectual to 
Anticolonial Revolutionary 
(Under the direction of Cemil Aydin) 
 This thesis analyzes the transition of Muhammad Barkatullah, a Muslim-Indian living 
under British colonial rule, from intellectual to anti-British revolutionary. The thesis assumes 
that this transition was not inevitable and seeks to explain when, why, and how Barkatullah 
became radicalized and turned to violent, revolutionary means in order to achieve independence 
from British rule, and away from demanding justice and equality within an imperial framework. 
To do this, the focus of the thesis is on the early period of his career leading up to the beginning 
of WWI. It examines his movements, intellectual production, and connections with various 
networks in the context of of major global events in order to illuminate his journey to 
revolutionary anti-colonialism.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The US-based revolutionary magazine, The United States of India, opened its November 
1927 edition with a heartfelt obituary: 
Maulvi Barkatullah, a great revolutionary leader and a staunch patriot, passed away in San 
Francisco on September 12, 1927. His death is a grave loss to India in that it constitutes a 
severe blow to the revolutionary movement whose main pillar he had been for more than thirty 
years. The loss will not easily be forgotten, nor will the gap created soon be filled. Heroes like 
Barkatullah are not born everyday.
1
 
 
Despite the glowing words, Muhammad Barkatullah’s legacy, while not “forgotten,” has not 
received the attention it deserves. The only significant English-language scholarly work, to-date, 
focusing explicitly on Barkatullah is a recent article by Humayun Ansari.
2
  
That is not to say that he is completely invisible in other scholarly work. Look under the 
surface and Barkatullah appears sporadically in a variety of fields, most notably, in the work on 
                                                     
1
 “India Loses Hero,” The United States of India 5, no. 5 (1927): 2. 
 
2
 Humayun Ansari, “Maulana Barkatullah Bhopali’s Transnationalism,” in Transnational Islam in the Interwar 
Period in Interwar Europe: Muslim Activists and Thinkers, ed. Gotz Nordbruch and Umar Ryad (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2014), 181-209. This is an excellent overview of Barkatullah’s career and Ansari does address 
Barkatullah’s early career and puts forward some convincing arguments as to when and why Barkatullah’s shift from 
an intellectual to an anti-colonial revolutionary may have taken place. The space given to it in this short article, 
however, with a large portion of it aimed at exploring his revolutionary activities during and after WWI, means that 
Ansari is unable to provide a clear picture of Barkatullah, the intellectual, becoming Barkatullah, the revolutionary. 
This is partly because, similar to other writings on Barkatullah, while Ansari claims that Barkatullah was a respected 
intellectual, he does so without dissecting his ideas or analyzing his substantial intellectual contributions and, 
instead, focuses on his revolutionary activities from WWI onwards. Barkatullah had a long career before 1914, a 
period in which he was a prolific writer. Most of this large collection of articles have never been cited, let alone 
analyzed thus far. 
 
 2 
Indian radicals based outside of India.
3
 He was, after all, one of the early participants in 
what became a geographically expanding, ideologically diversifying, and politically radicalizing 
web of Indian revolutionaries and anti-colonial activists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.
4
  
Radical international network and Barkatullah’s internationalism 
While this revolutionary network did not have a headquarters or an originator, it is said to 
have first taken root in organizations set up by Indian activists living in the United Kingdom in 
the last decade of the nineteenth century before spreading around the world through a host of 
crucial vectors.
5
 The most important nodes in this network were London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, 
Istanbul, San Francisco, Tokyo, Singapore and Shanghai. The revolutionaries in this 
interconnected global network cut across class, religious, linguistic, and ethnic lines. And, while 
the network was predominantly comprised of Indian men, it is important to not ignore the 
importance of women like Madame Bhikaji Rustom Cama in London, Paris and Germany for the 
movement. 
 The movement leaped forward when members on the U.S. West Coast formed the 
                                                     
3
 One of the earliest works that looks at Barkatullah’s activities is T.R. Sareen’s Indian Revolutionary Movement 
Abroad (1905-1921) (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1979). It is a useful summary of this transnational network 
that does mention Barkatullah’s work and connections in the United States, Berlin, Afghanistan and in Bolshevik 
Russia.  
 
4 For instance, Cemil Aydin’s work looks at the connections between Pan-Islamism and Pan-Asianism, The Politics 
of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), while Michael Silvestri explores the Irish and Indian nationalist connections in Ireland and 
India: Nationalism, Empire and Memory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Humayun Ansari, on the other 
hand, looks at early Pan-Islamic socialists in “Pan Islam and the Making of the Early Indian Muslim Socialists,” 
Modern Asian Studies 20, no. 3 (1986): 590-537. For literature looking at Barkatullah’s work in the United 
Kingdom, see Humayun Ansari’s “Maulana Barkatullah Bhopali’s Transnationalism” and Ron Geaves’ 
autobiography of Abdullah Quilliam, Islam in Victorian Britain: The Life and Times of Abdullah Quilliam (London: 
Kube Publishing, 2010). 
 
5
 Sareen, Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad (1905-1921), xi. 
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Ghadar Party in 1913.
6
 Ghadar served as the “connecting tissue” for this network and should not 
be understood as a purely nationalist movement. For historian Maia Ramnath, while the 
Ghadarite goal to liberate India “from foreign occupation is easily intelligible to nationalist logic, 
in both geographical and ideological terms they [over-spilled] the purview of of mainstream 
nationalism,” and figures used internationalist methods and invoked universal principles as they 
worked alongside various non-Indian networks and governments.
7
 These revolutionaries 
comprised Pan-Islamists, Socialists and Anarcho-Syndicalists but despite this ideological 
heterogeneity they shared a vision of an India free from British rule. For instance, Barkatullah 
was both and Indian nationalist and a loyal Pan-Islamist who strongly believed in Muslim unity 
and the symbolic importance of the role of the Caliph. For him, nationalism and Pan-Islamic 
solidarity were by no means contradictory.
8
 Barkatullah’s internationalism is exhibited by his 
writings pertaining to colonialism not directly linked to India and Islam, and by his close 
working relationship with Irish Fenians, Japanese Pan-Asianists, Bolsheviks, and Pan-Islamists 
from around the world during his long career. As Ramnath writes, Barkatullah is “by far the most 
important interface of Pan-Islamism, communism, and Indian national liberation struggle,” as 
well as the central figure in the Indian movement’s activities in Japan.9 Both in terms of strategy 
and ambition, Barkatullah’s career as an anti-racist intellectual and anti-British revolutionary was 
internationalist in scope.  
                                                     
6
 “Ghadar” means mutiny or revolt in Urdu. 
 
7
 Maia Ramnath. Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement Charted Global Radicalism and Attempted to 
Overthrow the British Empire (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), 3. 
 
8
 It is important to note here that interwar Pan-Islamism was not necessarily anti-imperial either, for even Pan-
Islamic, anti-colonial activists like Rashid Rida and Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani had an ambivalent relationship 
with European empires. See Cemil Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017) and Umar Ryad, “Anti-Imperialism and the Pan-Islamic 
Movement,” in Islam and the European Empires, ed. David Motadel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 131-
149. 
 
9
 Ramnath, Haj to Utopia, 222. 
 4 
Migration and intersectionality 
 Barkatullah’s career, and the network as a whole, is best conceptualized in terms of 
movement and space. Movement and space help chart how, when and where Barkatullah’s shift 
from an Islamic intellectual to an anti-British revolutionary takes place. Movement of bodies, 
ideas and materials, facilitated by technological improvements in the printing press and 
steamship travel, were crucial for Barkatullah and other revolutionaries to access the kinds of 
environments needed in order to create productive spaces for activism, sharing ideas and 
intellectual production. Improving travel and communications technology also aided in both 
expanding and connecting geographically distant revolutionaries.  
It was his flight from British India in the 1880s that allowed Barkatullah to develop 
relationships with revolutionaries, both Indian and non-Indian, in cities like Liverpool (1880s-
1893), London (1893-1903), New York (1903-1909) and Tokyo (1909-1914). Only by relocating 
to the colonial metropole in the late 1880s would Barkatullah have been exposed, first hand, to 
the vitriolic racism the Muslim community faced in Britain in the nineteenth century. 
Barkatullah’s move to the United States in 1903, meanwhile, not only brought him into close 
proximity to radical Indian nationalists, Irish-American Feniains, socialists and African-
American intellectuals, but also helped him find a less oppressive environment than the United 
Kingdom where he could publish commentaries on British foreign policy with relative freedom. 
It was through living in exile that Barkatullah was most clearly able to recognize the 
intersections of his anti-British and Pan-Islamic political struggle. As Michael Goebel argues 
regarding nationalism in interwar Paris, migration “render[ed] injustices, inequalities, and the 
juridical pitfalls of colonialism much more palpable.” For Goebel, there was “something inherent 
 5 
in the very process of migration that piqued new ways of seeing the imperial order.”10  
The ability to learn and converse in various foreign languages – Hindi, Urdu, Arabic, 
Persian, English, Japanese and Arabic -- enabled Barkatullah to make moving between 
geographic, cultural and political spaces productive. Learning English in Bombay before leaving 
British India allowed him to communicate with a cosmopolitan array of intellectuals throughout 
his travels. While expertise in Arabic, Persian, Urdu and Hindi proved a major source of income 
for him while living in London and Tokyo, where he worked as a language instructor. The ability 
to write in different languages also opened up possibilities to address diverse audiences around 
the world. Understanding different languages helped Barkatullah translate ideas and concepts 
across linguistic, cultural and religious lines.  
In the end, prior to his decisive revolutionary turn, Barkatullah’s first significant move 
was to the heart of the British Empire in the 1880s, followed by escaping British imperial 
jurisdiction entirely by moving to the United States in 1903 and Japan in 1909.
11
 In many ways 
his movement exemplifies the  trajectories others within the Indian anti-colonial network took, 
usually reacting to the growing imperial policing and surveillance apparatus. Anti-colonial 
Indians began moving to the colonial metropole to escape oppression in British India and take 
advantage of the liberal environment in Britain. British authorities reacted to political activism in 
the colonial metropole by Indian residents with increased surveillance and targeted policing, 
especially after 1905. In the next phase of this cat-and-mouse game, Indian anti-colonial activists 
faced “trans-imperial cooperation” when they began moving to the Continent, in particular, Paris 
and Berlin. Barkatullah left Britain before 1905, however, he was probably aware, or at least had 
                                                     
10
 Michael Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4. 
 
11
 He, of course, did move back to the United States for a short period in 1913 before the start of WWI before 
beginning his cooperation with the Germans and the Ottomans during the war. 
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suspicions of the fact, that he was being monitored by Scotland Yard. While he did not move 
within Europe and, instead, moved to New York, parallel to their cooperative relationships with 
rival European empires like the French, the British trans-imperial surveillance apparatus had 
reached North America as well, when the West Coast began to see a large influx of Indian 
immigrants in the early twentieth century.
12
 Barkatullah then moved to Japan in 1909, which 
was, in part, an attempt to escape the trans-imperial surveillance network. Barkatullah, therefore, 
was not only having to escape the British empire’s territorial jurisdiction, but its surveillance and 
policing reach as well. It is important here to recognize how this racialized trans-imperial 
surveillance and policing affected the mode and narrative of Indian anti-colonialism. As 
Brückenhaus writes, the “feedback cycle” between the anti-colonialists and imperial policing 
“caused each other to become more transnational in the scope of their networks and in their 
ideologies.”13   
Road to radicalization  
While Barkatullah’s revolutionary activities and connections to other movements has 
been looked at by a variety of academics mentioned earlier, the wide lens applied to their work 
leaves important questions under-investigated. Particularly absent are the details in his journey 
towards sedition and eventual acceptance for the use violence in working towards his 
revolutionary objectives.  
The outbreak of World War One is generally considered to be a crucial moment that 
                                                     
12
 Seema Sohi, Echoes of Mutiny: Race, Surveillance and Indian Anticolonialism in North America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014) and “Race, Surveillance, and Indian Anticolonialism in the Transnational Western U.S.-
Canadian Borderlands,” The Journal of American History 98, no. 2 (2011): 420-436.  
 
13
 Daniel Brückenhaus, Policing Transnational Protest: Liberal Imperialism and the Surveillance of Anticolonialists 
in Europe, 1905-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 3. Seema Sohi makes a similar argument about the 
dialectic between imperial policing and anti-colonialism in the works cited in the footnote above. She discusses how 
Indians in North America began drawing connections between British colonialism and racialized immigration and 
discrimination in the United States and Canada. 
 
 7 
changed the landscape of radical anti-colonial resistance. While revolutionary activities 
intensified quantitatively and qualitatively after the outbreak of the Great War, one question still 
needs answering: when did radical revolutionaries begin to seriously imagine a future outside of 
empire? That is, going from the struggle for equal rights and privileges within empire through 
constitutional means and public pressure towards demanding independence through violence. 
What led anti-colonial thinkers to go from thinking about independence to using violence and 
collaborating with rival states or empires? The answers to these questions vary, both in terms of 
specific nationalist or transnational movements, and with regards to the individual figures within 
them. As Frederick Cooper contends, “[a]nti-colonial movements were not a stage along an 
inevitable pathway from empire to nation, but part of a wider pattern of struggle whose 
culmination in the multiplication of nation-states was conjunctural and contingent.”14 The same 
can be argued for individual revolutionaries as parts of these movements. Exploring the career of 
one individual allows for a focus on the precise moments and places where momentous changes 
occur in the lives of revolutionaries who were part of these larger, complex movements. While 
local and geopolitical events and environments significantly shape these experiences, academics 
need to be cognizant of the fact that these individual journeys are, in the end, also personal ones. 
While Erez Manela is right to assert that the “Wilsonian Moment” in 1919 was a 
transformational moment that brought the call by “colonized and marginalized peoples” for self-
determination to “much broader publics” outside of “just intellectuals and political elites,” this 
thesis does not narrate that story.
15
 By charting the trajectory of Barkatullah’s radicalism, this 
                                                     
14
 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2005), 153. 
 
15
 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial 
Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5-7.  
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thesis aims to highlight how, for many exiled Indians, the revolutionary ethos was present before 
self-determination sentiments became widespread in India itself after WWI.
16
 Instead of focusing 
on the importance of European and American imperial competition and the impact of calls for 
self-determination by the likes of Woodrow Wilson and, to a lesser extent, Vladimir Lenin, by 
exploring Barkatullah’s career up until the lead-up to the First World War, this thesis illustrates 
how the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905, the protests and anger in response to the proposed 
partition of Bengal, the Chinese Revolution in 1911, and interactions with anti-colonial 
revolutionaries like the Irish-American Fenians, played a significant role in convincing 
Barkatullah and others that British Raj in India had to be ended by any means, even violence. 
The outbreak of WWI provided the opening, and the possibility of forming imperial allies of 
convenience, for Barkatullah and his fellow Ghadarites to strike. 
Anti-Muslim racism and Civilizational Discourse 
Barkatullah began his career as a religious scholar and intellectual, born and educated in 
India, who became increasingly radicalized during his time living in Britain (1880s-1903) and 
the United States (1903-1909). His early positions on what relationship the British Empire 
should have with India seem ambivalent, particularly during his time in Britain. It was in the 
United States, with the freedom afforded to him, where his writings become more critical of 
British actions and motives around the world. Although he only began to cause British 
authorities serious alarm by publishing anti-British seditious materials after he moved to Tokyo 
in 1909. In the end, it was the outbreak of WWI when he eventually began actively working 
towards using violent means to overthrow the British, aligning himself with the Germans during 
WWI, and the Bolsheviks after the end of the war. While there is a clear intensification in 
                                                     
16
 It should be noted that Bengal had experienced radical anti-British protest and revolutionary violence in the 
aftermath of proposed partition of Bengal in 1905. This topic shall be addressed later in this thesis.  
 9 
Barkatullah’s radical ideas and methods, his trajectory remained contingent. It is important to 
recognize the significant difference between being an anti-colonial activist with revolutionary 
tendencies, and a revolutionary who becomes the enemy of a powerful state or empire. The 
former could mean a mild irritation to surveillance, while the latter implies treason, which, under 
British law, was punishable by death.  
 Over the course of this thesis, I argue that while Barkatullah’s overtly seditious activities 
may have begun after his move to Tokyo in 1909, it is his time in the United States, between 
1903 and 1909, that is equally crucial and thus in need of further investigation. Developing close 
working relationships with radical Indian and Irish nationalists in this space and at this historical 
moment was to prove transformational.  
Other geopolitical events that shaped Barkatullah’s vision and perspective were related to 
European powers’ actions in Ottoman territory. Barkatullah grew up in an Indian Muslim family, 
and pursued training as a religious scholar. More significantly, Barkatullah was an early Pan-
Islamic activist and intellectual, who believed in the importance of the Ottoman Empire, as a 
sovereign modern Muslim empire, and in the position of Caliph as the symbolic figurehead of 
the ‘Muslim World.’ It should be noted that the idea of the Muslim World emerges in the mid-
nineteenth century.
17
 His commitment to this ideological and political movement remained firm 
                                                     
17
 In his article, “Globalizing the Intellectual History of the Muslim World,” Aydin critically examines the history of 
the emergence of the ‘Muslim World’ and argues that the term itself, “a term referring to all Muslims in the world, 
simply did not exist before the mid-nineteenth century.” What were the intellectual and conceptual shifts within the 
Islamic intellectual tradition then that facilitated this new conceptualization of the ‘Muslim World’? In his article 
“The Language of Muslim Universality,” Faisal Devji goes back to the first major Muslim thinker, the British 
Muslim Indian Sayyid Ahmed Khan, who forged a link between Islam and humanity. Devji writes that a “global 
history only becomes possible once the human race emerges as its subject.” As Muslim reformers responded to 
critiques of Islam as backward, in relation to Europe, with regards to scientific and technological advancement, they 
argued against racial and civilizational theories and brought “humanity to the fore as history’s true subject.” 
Responding to critiques of Islam from enlightenment thinkers arguing that Islam, unlike Christianity, was 
backwards, fanatical and, crucially, did not conform to natural law, Khan argued that “Islam, when cleansed of 
superstitious accretions was both the most natural and the most universal of religions.” The crucial point to note here 
is that Khan, in proving Islam’s universality on “nineteenth century notions of nature and therefore with the human 
species, both which stood outside the doctrinal sphere of religion to provide criteria of its veracity.” Staying in 
 10 
until his death. 
 An issue Barkatullah’s Pan-Islamism brings up is, how we are to understand religion? 
Literature on Muslim engagement in politics has tended to move away from reducing Muslim 
motivations to religious piety or an uncritical adherence to an ancient, static, orthodox religious 
tradition. The tendency for intellectuals concerned with the issue of religion and its definition, 
specifically with regards to Islam, has been to focus on economic, political and sociological 
motives instead, and, in doing so, emphasize agency of the individuals and groups in question. 
While this approach is an important corrective to that reductive understanding of Muslim 
motivations, it often reduces ‘religion’ to a strategic tool.18 These instrumental understandings of 
religion ignore the emotional connection to one’s religious identity and the significance of 
religious tradition.  
I argue that not only does Barkatullah have a deep commitment to his Muslim identity, he 
is actively taking part in what Talal Asad calls the Islamic “discursive tradition” through his 
scholarship engaged with questions of role and nature of the Caliphate and Islam’s relationship 
with modernity.
19
 As this thesis will elaborate later, Barkatullah was trained as an Islamic scholar 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Muslim India, Devji looks at the Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s disciple, Altaf Husayn Ali, to see the implications of this. 
Ali, in trying to argue that Muslims, particularly Indian Muslims, had declined in relation to Christian Europe, had 
to redefine the umma, or the Muslim community, in sociological terms. This, in many ways, mirrored enlightenment 
thinkers who saw Islam in demographic as opposed to metaphysical or juridical terms. These ideas were being 
debated across Muslim societies, connected through improved communications and transportation infrastructure, 
facing various forms of contact with European colonialism. While it is important to stress that these reformulations 
were often responding, directly or indirectly, to critiques of Islam by European intellectuals with the backdrop of 
military, scientific and economic domination, these intellectuals were engaged in a dynamic process that critiqued, 
appropriated and adjusted European ideas. This was a process of translation not diffusion: Cemil Aydin, 
“Globalizing the Intellectual History of the Muslim World” in Global Intellectual History, ed. Samuel Moyn and 
Andrew Sartori (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 162 and Faisal Devji, “The Language of Muslim 
Universality,” Diogenes 57, no. 35 (2010): 25-39.  
 
18
 Benjamin Hopkins makes a similar argument, See, “Islam and Resistance in the British Empire” in Islam and the 
European Empires, ed. David Motadel (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), 167. 
 
19
 In his article, Ovamir Anjum defines this tradition as consisting of “discourses that seek to instruct practitioners 
regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it is established has a history.” 
Individuals, groups and institutions, are engaged in discourses related to past tradition to ensure “correct 
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in India, and thus Islam has an enduring presence throughout his writing. Islam was not just a 
tactic, but rather formed a significant framework of his worldview. That being said, it is 
important to not reduce Barkatullah’s ideas and motivations to any essentialist reading of his 
Muslim-ness and to note the diversity of ideological, personal, and geopolitical influences that 
informed him.  
Barkatullah’s ideas were being formulated in the context of discourses on the universality 
of civilization. In the civilization discourse from the beginning of the 19
th
 century, civilization 
was inextricably linked with the idea of progress and modernity. While it was global, it was also 
linked, implicitly or explicitly, to the concept of race and the nation. Non-European intellectuals 
around the world were universalizing European enlightenment ideals and concepts, by 
                                                                                                                                                                           
performance” for the present and the future. Therefore, Islamic discursive tradition is a “historical set of evolving 
discourses, embodied in the set of practices and institutions of Islamic societies and hence deeply imbricated in the 
material life of those inhabiting them.” This ‘Islam’ is deeply embedded in the material- the political, the economic, 
and the social. Asad also critiques Geertz’s understanding of Religion. For Asad, Geertz’s definition of religion 
ignores power and materiality: power to interpret scripture, to implement norms through institutions, and to exercise 
disciplinary power. Geertz, Asad argues, distinguishes religion from politics, science and common-sense and never 
“examines whether…religious ‘experience’ relates to something in the social world believers live in” which is 
related to his understanding of “symbols as sui generis, the precondition for religious experience (which, once 
registered, must by definition be ‘genuine’), rather than a condition of social life (facilitating some objectives and 
making others difficult).” Islam and religion, therefore, should be understood as a “discursive tradition,” and hence, 
not a closed-system and deeply connected to the material. Religion, according to this understanding, cannot be 
reduced to, or disconnected from, politics, economics, culture and society. While institutions and power relations are 
always important, it should be noted that individuals certainly have agency according to this conceptualization. As 
Anjum notes in summarizing Asad’s position, that “[r]efication of Islam is not possible…because it is not a fixed 
social system but rather…a relationship with certain foundational texts and a particular historical narrative of their 
origins.” Ordinary Muslims, not just specialists in Islamic jurisprudence, particularly since the wide-spread 
availability of the printing press since the nineteenth century in the Muslim world, participate in this tradition 
through interpretation and argumentation: “Islam as a Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and his interlocutors,” 
Comparative Studies of South Africa, and the Middle East 27, no. 3 (2007): 661. Tomoko Masuzawa’s The invention 
of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005) explores the emergence of ‘World Religion’ as a concept in nineteenth century 
European discourse. Discourses that Masuzawa would argue cannot be separated from geopolitics, and often helped 
buttress European colonialism. In this discourse, Islam, for instance, was often regarded as the lesser, Arab, Semitic 
religion, that compared unfavorably to the Aryan Christianity. She argues that, in the nineteenth century, Islam was 
generally seen as: “fastidiously elemental and constant, tending toward fanatic militancy. The nineteenth century 
devised some daring theories about the purported characteristics; the twentieth century forgot them. What has 
become invisible under the new discursive regime, then, is the very speculative logic that rationalized and 
legitimized the commonplace characterization in the first place.” This is the context in which Barkatullah was 
arguing that Islam was a universal religion that was compatible with modernity and, hence, not backwards, or 
fanatic. 
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translating, modifying and adapting these ideas into their own context.
20
 Far from rejecting 
enlightenment ideals, Barkatullah and others were arguing against their cultural, religious, 
linguistic and racial exclusivity.
21
 This global circulation of European ideas came as a result of 
geopolitical immediacy, by being forced to react to the consequences of rapid European military 
expansion, and were facilitated by technological advancements in steamship travel and the 
printing press. 
In his writings, Barkatullah argued that the ‘golden era’ of the Islamic civilization existed 
during the time of the Prophet Muhammad, up until the time of the third Caliph, Uthman. His 
strategy was to reconstruct a global history of civilizations and place Islam within it, in addition 
to making comparisons between social reform and institutions from the ‘golden era’ and 
contemporary Europe and North America. He did this to suggest that Muslims were indeed 
capable of having a civilization, and therefore Islam was not incompatible with progress and 
modernity as racialized European discourse had suggested. That is not to say he did not account 
for the contemporary state of affairs. While ‘European Civilization’ had ‘awoken’ from its 
slumber since the Reformation, Barkatullah argued, Muslims had rested on their laurels and their 
societies had stagnated. For Barkatullah, European encroachment on Muslim lands and the 
weakness of the Ottoman Empire, the only Muslim empire, illustrated this. However, despite the 
pessimistic outlook on the plight of contemporary Islamic civilization, he argued that the solution 
was to combine useful European technology and ideas with what was essential in Islam. In other 
words, to adapt ideas, institutions and technology from Europe and apply them into their context. 
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Barkatullah was also eager to emphasize the egalitarian potential within the Qur’an and the 
message of the Prophet Muhammad. He argued that the Prophet was a gradualist social reformer 
and the fault in Muslim societies was not that the Prophet’s message was defective, but rather 
that Muslim leaders had forgotten the egalitarian ethos inherent within Islam. 
In the end, Barkatullah’s commitment to Pan-Islamic solidarity in the face of racialized 
discourse on Islam and the Ottoman Empire remained firm right until his death. However, 
Barkatullah’s career cannot be reduced to his Pan-Islamic activism, as exhibited in his 
connections with Irish-Fenians, radical Indian nationalists, Pan-Asianists, socialists, liberal 
Christians and occultists from Britain and the United States. Barkatullah’s empowerment from 
his involvement in an increasingly radicalized global network in the years leading up to the First 
World War, and his increasing disillusionment with Britain’s ability to offer justice and equality, 
cemented his anti-colonial vision for the future of India. This is that story. 
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CHAPTER II 
BARKATULLAH OF BHOPAL: ISLAM AND PAN-ISLAM 
 
 While Barkatullah’s career as an intellectual and revolutionary was almost entirely 
outside of India, his early life is important for understanding not only his understanding of 
Islamic historical and theological debates but, arguably more importantly, his interest and 
enduring commitment to the Pan-Islamic movement that emerged in a formative stage of his life 
and career.  
Muhammad Barkatullah was born around 1864 in the princely state of Bhopal, in the 
central state of Madhya Pradesh in present-day India.
22
 His father, Shaikh Kadratullah, worked 
for the Bhopal State as a Munshi, or secretary, but died when Barkatullah was still very young in 
1876. Barkatullah was educated in Urdu, Arabic, Persian languages and Islamic philosophy at 
the Madrasa-e-Sulemania, as he worked towards becoming an Islamic scholar, or alim.
23
  
Barkatullah’s first move came within British India, as he travelled to Khandwa and then 
Bombay, where he enrolled to study English and worked as a tutor. Change, even from 
Barkatullah’s early career wasn’t just geographical, but also intellectual and political. The Indian 
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Mutiny of 1857 marked the end of Indian Muslim sovereignty in India. The trauma of 
colonialism, the loss of sovereignty coupled with imperial racism,  proved to be a “major catalyst 
in the intensification of intellectual activity among reform-minded Muslim scholars” and ushered 
in the birth of new, competing reformist movements.
24
 The most significant new reformist outfits 
in the late 19
th
 century South Asia were the Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl-i Hadith and Ahmadiyyah.
25
 
As Sher Ali Tareen suggests, these movements were engaged in bitter polemical debates on 
normative practice of Islam in the context of modernity. This period also marked a major shift 
from contestation of authority between individual scholars to “an unprecedented group-centered 
orientation.”26 This was the intellectual landscape in which Barkatullah, the young alim, was 
educated.
27
 
On the global level, there was an emergence of the Muslim World as a concept and Pan-
Islamism as a transnational movement from the mid-nineteenth. Cemil Aydin argues that the 
term Muslim World itself, a term referring to all Muslims around the world, did not exist before 
prior to this period and “became the basis of the ideal of Pan-Islamism.”28 The idea of the 
Muslim World emerged in the context of the increasing European encroachment into Muslim-
majority territories, with the aggressive colonial expansion being “sustained by more systematic 
theories of Orientalism and race ideology, establishing permanent identity-walls between 
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Christian white Europeans on the one hand and the Muslim world or the ‘colored races’ on the 
other.”29 It is in this context that “a Muslim world identity emerged as a commonsense 
knowledge, a geopolitical reality, and a civilizational-religious identity that everybody agreed 
on.”30 
One of the most influential early Pan-Islamists was Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
(1838-1897). Al-Afghani, born in Asadabad in Northwestern Iran, had been expelled from Egypt 
and moved to India for a brief period where Barkatullah is said to have met him.
31
 Al-Afghani’s 
activism involved a double-critique: he not only criticized Western rule over Muslim societies 
but also challenged the authority of traditional ulama. His solutions lay in Muslim unity and a 
“revival of reason as a force of guidance” along with more polities with more “representative 
forms of government.”32  
The compatibility of ‘Islam’ with ‘reason’, the push for democratic reforms and Pan-
Islamism that al-Afghani strove for, became the most durable commitments throughout 
Barkatullah’s career. It should be noted that the context for these arguments on Islam’s 
relationship with ‘reason’, ‘science’, and ‘democracy’ wasn’t just Western colonialism. Rather, 
figures like al-Afghani were directly addressing Eurocentric critiques of Islam represented in 
their binary oppositions: ‘superstition’, ‘traditional metaphysics’ and ‘tyranny’. Arguably, what 
al-Afghani is most famous for came after he left India for Paris, when he impressively critiqued 
the influential French academic Ernest Renan’s lecture attacking Islam for being an obstacle to 
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science and modernity.
33
 The al-Afghani-Renan debate would have been a moment that Muslim 
students and intellectuals like Barkatullah would have keenly followed and discussed. 
Barkatullah would begin countering Eurocentric discourse on Islam himself when moving to 
Britain. 
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CHAPTER III 
BARKATULLAH IN IMPERIAL BRITAIN: THE PAN-ISLAMIST INTELLECTUAL 
AND ACTIVIST 
 
 Barkatullah moved to Britain in the late 1880s, when he was still a young man.
34
 Despite 
growing up in under British rule, the move to the colonial metropole had to have been a 
significant change for him. The journey may have seemed like the logical choice; Barkatullah 
was convinced by al-Afghani’s position that “Muslim freedom was possibly only if the secrets of 
European intellectual, military, technological, and political superiority had been mastered.”35 
Barkatullah arrived at an interesting time in British history. The late 19
th
 century saw the earliest 
institutionalization of Islam in Britain, with the establishment of the first Mosque and Islamic 
institute in Liverpool under the leadership of Abdullah Quilliam in 1887. Barkatullah became its 
first imam.  
Quilliam, a solicitor born in a Methodist family, officially converted to Islam in 1888 and 
became an unlikely international Pan-Islamic figure. Similar to Barkatullah, the relative 
accessibility of steamship travel and the printing press played an important role in Abdullah 
Quilliam’s life and career. Quilliam’s travels through North Africa had sparked his initial interest 
in Islam. Islam provided an alternative to what he saw as the “Christian decay and depravity,” the 
symptoms being the rising alcoholism and sectarianism that he observed in Liverpool.
36
 New 
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publications provided Quilliam and the burgeoning community with both a voice to educate 
fellow Muslims and the wider British public about Islam, and a space for discussion on both 
local and global issues. This community was establishing itself, however, in a period marked by 
anti-Muslim bigotry. From negative articles in newspapers, to hatred directed towards new 
converts, to desecration of mosques and Islamic institutes, to physical attacks, the experience of 
the Liverpool Muslim community was reminiscent of Muslims living in post-9/11 Europe and 
United States. 
Barkatullah’s impressions of his new surroundings were still generally positive, however. 
The decay in Muslim societies, as he saw it, was a result of despotic governments that neglected 
educating their subjects. For Barkatullah, living and working among this burgeoning Muslim 
community with a large number of converts, led him to conclude that since “Muslims in the 
West are Muslims by reason, not by birth, they promise to be the pioneers of future 
civilization.”37 The positivity may have been partly due to the fact that Barkatullah had escaped 
the oppressiveness of the Government of India and moving to the liberal, “soft heart” of the 
British Empire, although it was his optimism and regard for the model established by Quilliam in 
Liverpool that is crucial.
38
 
Part of his remit, as a religious figure in Britain, was to try and address some of the 
misconceptions of the ‘Islamic civilization.’ In a fascinating article, published in 1892, in the 
Indian Magazine and Review, Barkatullah wrote a brief history of the Hajj. The publication was 
established by the National Indian Association (NIA), a British-based organization that had both 
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Indian and English members. While the article looks at the evolution of the pilgrimage, 
Barkatullah’s agenda was to highlight the modernity inherent within a traditional Muslim custom 
while, at the same time, criticizing Muslim leadership in leaving their societies behind “the 
West.” The article was written at a time when new European colonial “transport infrastructure — 
the hard networks that bound steam hubs together — … [had] intensified Muslim contact with 
non-Muslim peoples and places,” while making “the cost of a passage to the Hijaz affordable to 
a larger number of pilgrims than ever before.” 39 European empires, the British empire in 
particular, had also become increasingly entangled in the administration of Hajj travel. European 
introduced steamship travel had unintended consequences, therefore, by not only altering the 
demographics of pilgrims, both in terms of “sheer numbers and ethnic diversity,” but also 
affecting disease control and, crucially, helping to unite Muslims from distant geographies across 
the world.
40
 The increased use of steamship travel prompted surveillance by the British on 
pilgrims as authorities feared this would provide an avenue for anti-British activities.  
For Barkatullah, the Hajj, aside from bringing Muslims from around the world together 
for the sake of brotherhood and intellectual and cultural exchange, was also beneficial for trade 
and industry. For instance, he argues that the “influx of people every year” would necessitate 
labor and “thereby give an impetus to the industry of the inhabitants.”41 Most significantly, the 
“system of pilgrimage is based on strict commercial science.”42 To illustrate the modern nature 
of the “system”, he compared the “results” to that of the “World’s Fair”, like the one held in 
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Paris in 1889. In a strategy consistent with his later work, he goes on to criticize Muslim leaders 
for not improving the sanitation and facilities for the pilgrim since “the primeval ages,” that 
could, in the future, lead to infectious diseases like cholera spreading among pilgrims.
43
 He 
called on the “Sultan and the Sheriff of Mecca to introduce reform in this direction at once, and 
to do away with this evil forever.”44 Hence, while Barkatullah was keen to emphasize the 
modernity of the pilgrimage system in its early years, he was unwilling to credit the Ottoman 
leadership for the recent improvements to pilgrimage travel. 
A feature of Barkatullah’s career was his ability to write in multiple languages, and this 
was certainly the case during his time in Britain. Even in his early intellectual career outside of 
India in Britain, he did not exclusively write about Islam or Muslims. Not long after leaving 
India, Barkatullah wrote several pieces for an Urdu language periodical called the The Mirror of 
British Merchandise and Hindustani Pictorial News. The publication focused on advertising 
British-produced goods, using Indian raw materials, that were being sold in India at higher price, 
along with looking at exploring the close ties between Britain and its colony. According to a 
review of his writings in The Mirror, he encourages Indians to travel to Britain, despite the 
arduousness of the journey, aim of providing information for aspiring Indians in future articles. 
In another, Barkatullah paints a “vivid picture of Western intelligence,” encouraging Indian 
women “to follow” Western women’s lead towards intellectual pursuits in an article translated as 
“Our Ladies.”45 The question that brings up is: do Indian women not engage in, or have 
                                                     
43
 There had been several cholera epidemics relating to the Hajj in the second-half of the nineteenth century. In fact, 
it was the devastating cholera epidemic of 1865 that initially prompted the British to get involved in Hajj 
administration. See John Slight, The British Empire and the Hajj, 1865-1956 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2015).  
 
44
 Barkatullah, “The Mecca Pilgrimage,” 187. 
 
45
 A.M.K. Dehlavi, “The Mirror of British Merchandise and Hindustani Pictorial News,” Indian Magazine and 
Review, No. 263 (Nov, 1892): 582.  
 22 
ambitions towards pursuing, intellectual activities? A speech Barkatullah gives after moving to 
London may give a clue as to his understanding of Muslim women of his generation.     
It was probably around 1893 when Barkatullah moved to London, and became directly 
implicated in the imperial project as he worked as the “principal of the Oriental 
Academic…where he trained students from Oxford and Cambridge universities, going in for the 
Indian Civil Service examinations, in Arabic, Persian and [Urdu] languages and literatures.”46 In 
London, he not only became an integral figure in Indian and Pan-Islamic organizations, 
Barkatullah also established relationships with network of radical reformers, that included 
liberals, socialists and theosophists. For instance, between 1895 and 1898, several lectures were 
given on Sundays at the South Place Institute in Finsbury, London, and Barkatullah was one of 
the speakers.  
The South Place Institute was a part of the English Ethical Movement in the mid-1880s. 
This movement attracted a constellation of radical thinkers and reformers that, at various 
moments, included: secularists, atheists, socialists, liberal thinkers, theosophists and free-
thinkers.
47
 As Peter Weiler writes, the ethical movement was “one of many Victorian responses 
to the loss of faith created by biblical criticism and science, was an attempt to save the moral 
message of Christianity, once the Bible could no longer be taken as proof.”48 In that regard, 
South Place and other ethical societies, “provided a meeting place for reformers to discuss social 
questions and also represented an important aspect of their social thought.”49 This included 
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figures like Annie Besant (1847-1933),
 
for instance, the international leader of the Theosophical 
Society (TS), who had close relations with Indian nationalists and had given several lectures on 
Islam, one of which, entitled Islam in the Light of Theosophy was also delivered at the South 
Place Institute several years after Barkatullah’s, in which she would go on to make some similar 
arguments to the ones he made.
50
  
While the audience can be seen as being receptive to hearing critiques of British rule as 
well as non-Eurocentric perspectives on the society and cultural practices of empire’s “colonies, 
settlements, and countries spread” around the world, it was not a platform where speakers were 
invited to call for an end to British rule itself.
51
 As the “Prefatory Note” of the first volume 
makes clear, the idea behind the lectures was “that a wider and deeper knowledge of the growth, 
present condition, and possibilities of each integral part of our Empire would tend to strengthen 
the sympathetic, material, and political ties which unite the colonies to the mother country.”52  
The lecture delivered by Barkatullah, published as an essay in The British Empire Series 
Volume I, was focused on the position of women in Islam.
53
 For this liberal, non-Muslim 
audience, Barkatullah attempted to provide a counter-narrative to Western discourse on Muslim 
women that depicted them as an erotic, exotic subjects of investigation, subjugated and lacking 
agency in uncivilized societies. The discourse over the status of women in India had political 
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implications as well. As Siobhan Lambert-Hurley explains, “[o]ver the course of the nineteenth 
century, ‘the women question’ emerged as one of the grounds on which British administrators 
and their Indian subjects debated the subcontinent’s fitness over self-rule with their position of 
women an indicator of a society’s development.”54 Barkatullah’s position in this lecture are 
similar to that of his compatriot residing in Britain, Syed Ameer Ali and other Indian Muslim 
modernist men of the time.
55
  
Barkatullah argues that, while no one could claim with any credibility that “all Islamic 
institutions are perfect,” the European gaze lacked historical knowledge and cultural context.56 
An ethnocentric understanding of “happiness,” according to Barkatullah, had meant that because 
Muslim women did “not have the pleasure of free intercourse with men,” Muslim women lives 
were seen as desperate and miserable.
57
 Images depicting Muslim women being “caged, like 
wild beasts, to toil and be tortured” was pure fiction. For Barkatullah, the “means of acquiring 
happiness in different countries may be different,” and women in Muslim societies had spaces 
where they joked, laughed, sang, listened to music.
58
 Not only that, women had power and 
authority in the domestic sphere and had begun to gain education at universities. To a very 
limited extent, some were even participating in contemporary politics. For instance, Her 
Highness Shah Jahan Begum was the contemporary leader of his home state of Bhopal, whose 
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leadership he goes on to praise. Interestingly, Sultan Shah Jahan herself would go on to publish a 
series of lectures on the status of women’s rights in Islam in 1917.59   
In this lecture, Barkatullah takes possession of this anthropological lens, except, as an 
Islamic scholar, having grown up as Muslim man in India. Despite trying to highlight Muslim 
women agency, for all the images of them singing and laughing, he fails to give them a real 
voice. His writing does not suggest any Muslim women were consulted. While he argues that 
complete isolation from men did not exist during the time of Prophet Muhammad, they were 
“free” to enter public spaces with the condition of being “decently dressed.”60 The fact that 
public spaces were male spaces did not receive a critique, presumably one a Muslim woman 
might have provided. For Barkatullah, a woman was the “queen of her home”, who could have 
the tendency of being too enamored with “costly dresses and precious jewels.”61 Instead of 
recognizing feminist activism or challenging the structural impediments for women to enter 
male-dominated spheres in industry or politics, he bemoans their lack of ambition. However, as 
Ayesha Hidayatullah points out, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, Muslim women 
intellectuals and activists had begun calling for precisely those things Barkatullah found them 
passive regarding: “women’s equal rights in the public sphere, particularly in the areas of 
education, work, politics, and nationalist movements.”62  
Despite the male-centered perspective on the topic of women in Islam, Barkatullah’s 
article provided some important critiques of ethnocentric accounts in Western literature of the 
time. For Western intellectuals looking to give a more nuanced perspective on women’s place in 
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Islam, Barkatullah’s positions proved a useful resource. A British journalist named Walter 
Gallichan published a book in 1915 entitled Women under Polygamy to counter simplistic 
Western perceptions of polygamy. He relied heavily on Barkatullah’s article for his chapter on 
polygamy in Islam, although he thought Barkatullah was a Muslim woman.
63
  
Barkatullah’s perspectives on Islamic legal positions relating to polygamy are interesting. 
Feeling compelled to address the issue in light of criticism from Christian missionaries and 
orientalists that considered the practice ‘backwards’ and anti-women, he argues that Islam has 
often been criticized for condoning polygamy, yet it was a practice endemic in Arabia before 
Prophet Muhammad brought the message of Islam to the region. As a gradualist reformer, 
Barkatullah argued that, the Prophet, through the teachings of the Quran, “not only put a check” 
on the practice, but went as far as “morally abolish[ing] it.”64 While the Quran does permit a man 
to marry more than one wife, the conditional clause that they only do so if they can treat their 
wives equally, or with impartiality, was rendered “humanly impossible,” for Barkatullah. 
Therefore, he suggests we think of it as an “indirect prohibition” on polygamy.65 Interestingly, 
this was an area Barkatullah’s position contradicted that of Abdullah Quilliam. Quilliam had 
written several pro-polygamy articles and had and indeed practiced polygamy, having had two 
families simultaneously during his lifetime.
66
 As we shall see later, it would not be the only issue 
they would have fundamental disagreements over.  
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Barkatullah spoke at South Place on at least one more occasion 1900, when he was asked 
to open a discussion concerning the “Future of India” with the influential liberal, secularist 
reformer and freethinker, Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner (1858-1935).
67
 A brief review of the 
discussion in the South Place Magazine notes that Barkatullah viewed India as racially and 
culturally diverse place which was “essentially the land of philosophy and speculative thought, 
and its intelligence had for long been directed to the study of the problem of the universe.”68 
Therefore, India of the East was spiritual, a place in stark contrast to the material powers in the 
West. While the knowledge and experience of the West had been introduced to India through the 
British, Barkatullah bemoaned how the capitalist English had “monopolised the openings created 
by commerce, and Western machine products were killing the old-time native industries of 
India.”69 Barkatullah, it seems, had begun to take part in the discourse- in which Western 
theosophists played a central role- that looked at Asia or the East, as the spiritual ‘Other’ of the 
materialist West. In this narrative, the East was had something to offer to the West, despite being 
militarily and economically weaker. The strategy from Barkatullah, therefore, seems to be to 
argue that Islamic universalism and mystic traditions, had as much to offer as Hinduism and 
Buddhism. This was a strategy that seems to take hold properly after he moved to the United 
States when he focused on showcasing the esoteric aspects of Sufi Islam to liberal Christians, 
unitarians and theosophists. 
While the South Place was primarily a white, English institution, it is important to 
recognize that Barkatullah was not the only Indian, or Indian Muslim involved in the lecture 
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circuit at the institute. For instance, Muslim Indian reformers like Syed Ameer Ali and influential 
Bengali intellectual, activist and, later, politician, Romesh Chunder Dutt, were also invited to 
speak at about Islam and the conditions for Indians living under British rule. 
 The geopolitical dimension to the way Islam and Muslims were viewed in Britain and 
abroad was something the likes of Barkatullah and Quilliam were acutely aware of. As Ron 
Geaves notes in his biography of Abdullah Quilliam, “disturbances and acts of violence against 
the fledgling Muslim presence tended to flare up when there was a conflict between Britain and 
various parts of the Muslim World.”70 As the institute in Liverpool became an intellectual and 
diplomatic hub for Muslims visiting Britain, Quilliam developed close relationships with 
powerful Muslim leaders like the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Amir of Afghanistan. 
Quilliam was particularly loyal to the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph, who had become a significant 
donor for his work in Britain. For instance, in June 1894, he took a journey to Lagos for the 
opening of a new mosque as a representative of the Sultan and was officially appointed the 
Sheikh al-Islam of Britain.
71
 It was this global, diplomatic aspect of Quilliam’s ‘Liverpool 
model’ that appealed to Barkatullah as much as the symbolic importance of having a 
cosmopolitan mosque and Muslim organization at the heart of Imperial Britain. 
In the world of empires, where did loyalty lie for Pan-Islamists living in Britain? 
Barkatullah’s attitude towards the British Empire during his time in Liverpool and London was 
ambiguous. While he was certainly critical of bigoted depictions of Islam and Muslims, and was 
critical of British policies in India, he did not call for the end of British rule. At South Place, for 
instance, Barkatullah is said to have wanted India to “eventually receive [a] share of local 
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autonomy and equal treatment.”72 And, as Barkatullah, Quilliam and other Pan-Islamic activists 
viewed the Ottoman Empire as an important symbolic representation of Muslim modernity, the 
inheritors of the position of the Caliph, and a crucial source of income and legitimacy, their 
activism was directed towards convincing the British, as the “greatest Mohammedan power,” 
that a robust alliance with the Ottoman Empire was important.
73
 In a joint letter by the 
Committee of Indian Muslims in London, the two took umbrage with a Reuters telegram that, in 
their view, reported negatively on the Ottoman Sultan based on information from untrustworthy 
sources. Their hope was that the “British Press will not be influenced by Levantines…whose sole 
object[ive] is to create bad feeling in England against Turkey” and the Sultan.74 The letter 
concludes with a crucial statement: “As Indian Mohamedans, most faithful and loyal subjects of 
our most gracious Majesty the Queen, we have at heart to see the relations between Turkey and 
England based on the most cordial footing.”75  Barkatullah’s name was the first one that appeared 
under the letter, signed as the chairman of the organization.
 
 
In London, Barkatullah had also become closely associated with Muslim activists like 
Mushir Husain Kidwai, Rafiuddin Ahmad and Munshi Abdul Karim, Syed Ameer Ali, and was 
involved in Pan-Islamic associations like the Muslim Patriotic League (MPL) and the Anjuman-I 
Islam (AI).
76
 Despite the prayers for Queen’s health, as part of the MPL, Barkatullah had also 
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become more critical of British policies.
77
 He had also been put under surveillance, most likely 
due to British paranoia over Pan-Islamism and Muslim disloyalty, along with the possibility of 
disrupting “linked-up agitation,” between British liberals and Indian activists. In that regard, 
Barkatullah was seen as a someone who needed to be monitored closely.
78
 According to British 
Intelligence reports, Barkatullah had even served as a “news agent” for the Amir of Afghan 
while working London, providing a weekly newsletter through an Afghan agent in Karachi from 
1896 and 1898.
79
 Crucially, Barkatullah had diverged from Abdullah Quilliam with regards to 
his loyalty to the Sultan. While Barkatullah wanted a strong Ottoman Empire, he did not believe 
the Sultan was an able leader. Barkatullah’s critical stance towards Abdulhamid remain 
consistent throughout his career and seem to mirror the Young Turks’ position, who he aligned 
himself with.
80
 According to a Scotland Yard report, he had become “involved in a conspiracy 
against” the Sultan and after the news reached Constantinople, had Barkatullah “ventured on 
Ottoman territory” during Sultan Abdulhamid’s reign, “he would have been arrested at once.”81 
Whether he was actually involved in a conspiracy against the Sultan is unclear, however, he was 
almost certainly connected to the Young Turk journalist, activist and, later in life, politician, 
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Mehmet Ubeydullah Efendi, who was exiled by Abdulhamid and spent several years in Britain, 
including six months in Liverpool.
82
 As we shall see later, this relationship with the Young Turks 
would prove important during WWI. 
With Britain increasingly drawn into various nationalist rebellions in the Ottoman 
controlled Balkans at the turn of the century, and with the increasingly anti-Ottoman rhetoric in 
the press, arguing for the importance of the Ottoman-British alliance became even more crucial. 
Yet, with the threat of treason, criticizing British foreign policy vis-à-vis the Balkans was 
proving difficult for both Barkatullah and Quilliam.  
Barkatullah had also become interested in the tactics of the Irish Home Rule movement, 
quite possibly, through his connections to radical circles that congregated at societies like the 
South Place Institute. Besant, for instance, not only strongly identified strongly with her Irish 
roots, had also become an advocate for Irish Home Rule from the 1880s.
83
 Possibly because he 
may have begun to feel suffocated under the watchful eye of British authorities, and due to the 
lure of more freedom across the Atlantic, he was convinced by Muhammad Alexander Russell 
Webb, an American convert to Islam “in a similar mould to Abdullah Quilliam,” to move to the 
United States.
84
 Despite the British intelligence reports on Barkatullah, his radicalization in 
London, and his interests in Irish nationalist tactics, at this stage, Barkatullah was not yet a 
revolutionary. He was still primarily a Muslim-Indian intellectual, just one who was becoming 
increasingly critical of the British Empire and a part of various Indian, Pan-Islamic and liberal 
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networks in London. Barkatullah was on the move once again, this time exploring a 
cosmopolitan environment outside British territorial jurisdiction. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BARKATULLAH IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RADICAL PAN-ISLAMIST AND 
INDIAN NATIONALIST 
 
 Barkatullah, now an established intellectual with connections in Indian nationalist and 
Pan-Islamic circles around the world, set sail for New York in 1903.
85
 Considering the restraints 
in the colonial metropole, moving to the United States must have felt liberating. Barkatullah 
began publishing in journals almost immediately after arriving at his new home. While he 
continued to try and educate non-Muslim audiences about Islam and fighting back against 
arguments of Muslim ‘backwardness,’ Barkatullah also began to enter some of the important 
foreign policy debates of the time writing, primarily, in New Thought magazines like The Arena 
and Mind, both published by Charles Brodie Patterson. This suggests a clear departure from his 
time in Britain, where he limited himself by-in-large to writing about Islam. Most likely due to 
the freedom afforded to him, particularly during his early years in the United States, he ventured 
into the arena of international politics, one he would enter even more directly, as a significant 
player, later in his career.  
His first article, published in September 1903, examined yet another major theme in the 
discourses on Islam, in both Muslim and non-Muslim spheres: the relationship between Islam 
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and democracy. The article begins in his characteristically direct style by Barkatullah asserting 
his position that democracy is the ideal system for any polity. One that not only “tends to secure 
the greatest amount of happiness [for] the largest number possible”, but is also the only form of 
government that would be “able to establish peace on earth and good will among all nations of 
the globe.”86 In part, probably trying to ingratiate himself to his new hosts, as with the genuine 
impressions of other intellectuals who had immigrated to the US at this time, he was quick to 
highlight how the United States was the ideal example of a flourishing democracy.
87
 Although 
judging from his comments on the racial prejudice faced by African Americans discussed later in 
this thesis, his praise may have been referring more to American ideals than the reality. Although 
the official position, at the time, to allow revolutionaries from around the world to organize in 
the United States so long as they did not break any US laws, probably played a part in 
Barkatullah’s thinking.  
Justice, considered a key feature of a democracy, also existed in the early ‘Islamic 
Civilization,’ according to Barkatullah. Laws were established in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of Islam, and the Shura council functioned similarly to “modern 
legislative assemblies”, while the Caliph was the executive, after the Prophet’s death.88 The 
demise of this “glorious democracy” came about during the time of the third Caliph, Othman. 
Barkatullah argues that there is a “striking analogy between the circumstances and causes” 
leading to the demise of the Roman Republic and the Islamic Commonwealth. While Rome 
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suffered due to the fear Julius Caesar’s growing power engendered for the safety of the republic, 
the commonwealth’s downfall in Arabia resulted from the alarmed “Muslim patriots” who feared 
for the “security of the Islamic Commonwealth” due to his “partiality to his kinsmen.”89 The 
comparisons of the halcyon days and the demise of the Islamic Commonwealth with 
contemporary United States and the Roman Empire were a rhetorical strategy used to illustrate 
Islam’s inherent compatibility with democracy and, the concept it was implicitly linked with, 
modernity. 
Searching back to the origins of the ‘Islamic Civilization,’ he used the establishment of 
an ‘Islamic commonwealth’ by Prophet Muhammad in Arabia, as the ideal example of Islamic 
democracy. Significantly, in Barkatullah’s eyes, there existed “perfect equality” in the 
commonwealth, without any discrimination based on “caste, color, race, or position.”90 There is 
no mention of gender in this regard, however. An example of the equality in this polity, for 
Barkatullah, is how “Bilal, a negro ex-slave, had no less respect than Omar,” a companion of 
Prophet Muhammad who would later go on to become the second Caliph after the Prophet’s 
death.
91
  
The mention of Bilal here is interesting, as Edward E. Curtis demonstrates, Bilal ibn 
Rabah would later become an important symbol for people of African descent all over the world, 
including African American Muslims.
92
 While it is unclear whether Barkatullah was attempting 
to attract African Americans to Islam through the call of racial inequality in this article, he was 
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clear in other publications about what religion African Americans would be advised to join. In a 
letter to the editor published on May 3
rd
 1903 in The New York Daily Tribune, Barkatullah 
responds to a previously published article he deemed to be misrepresenting Islam by claiming 
that Muslims despise “the white Christian.”93 Barkatullah argues that Islam is a universal religion 
that is against any form of racial prejudice, and a religion that has followers around the world 
from a number of races, including the “negro race.” For him, the root of Muslim ire was not 
Christianity but racist Christian missionaries. Barkatullah argues that it is not Muslims or Islam 
that has a problem with racial inequality but the West, when he writes that the “color problem 
and the question of the superiority and inferiority of race is the creation of the Anglo-Saxon race, 
which appears in different guises in the different parts of the world, and is accentuated to the 
highest pitch in the United States of America.”94 Barkatullah goes even further to argue that like 
Christian missionaries going to Muslim-majority societies attempting to convert “unitarians to 
the trinitarian faith,” Muslim missionaries should be allowed to be sent to “the negroes of the 
South to convert them to Islam.”95  
Barkatullah, it seems, had also become involved with an upper-class, inter-racial, and 
socialist group known as the Cosmopolitan Society of New York.
96
 Craig Steven Wilder 
describes this social group as one that “opposed all concepts of racial superiority” and held 
“regular meetings in the homes of Brooklyn’s white and black elite,” discussing issues related to 
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resisting race-based oppression.
97
 Similar to his time in the United Kingdom, there is no 
indication Barkatullah had any significant relationships in the contemporaneous working-class 
communities in the United States that Vivek Bald discusses in his work, for instance.
98
 These 
elite, if not necessarily mainstream, connections allowed Barkatullah to publish in a variety of 
newspapers and journals.    
Barkatullah’s first foray in the US writing about contemporary international politics came 
in November 1903, in the influential literary journal, The North American Review. Publishing in 
the oldest literary journal in the United States reflected his stature as an intellectual and the 
strength of his connections. Barkatullah, in his punchy, direct style, describes the ‘Great Game’ 
European powers -- namely France, Britain and Russia-- were playing with the “crumbling 
edifice” of the Ottoman Empire. In this game, the Europeans held all the cards. The situation in 
Macedonia, the subject of his article, was similar to what had been happening in Crete and the 
Balkans since the early-19
th
 century. Christian subjects had been “imbued with seditious 
sentiments through the influence of missionaries” and had brought “the question of the Cross 
versus the Crescent” back into prominence.99 The diplomatic game France, Britain and Russia 
were engaged in was with the pretense of humanitarianism, Barkatullah is eager to point out. 
They portrayed themselves as the protectors of Christians in the ‘East,’ although, under the 
surface, the reasons for the conflict were power and geopolitics. The Ottoman Empire, which he 
saw as a cosmopolitan Muslim empire, was hated because of its religion.  
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Barkatullah’s criticism was not limited to these European empires, however. He was 
incisive in skewering the capitalists and the Ottoman Sultan. The capitalists, for Barkatullah, 
held a great deal of influence and power in the affairs of ‘nations.’ They exploited not just the 
labor classes, but also saw revolutions as an opportunity for profit. As Barkatullah writes, 
revolutions are “harvest time for the capitalists,” when they strike favorable deals and take 
control of finances.
100
 While he never claimed to be a socialist, even as he called all Muslims to 
ally with the Bolsheviks after WWI, he used the vocabulary of socialist critiques from an early 
stage. He admonishes Sultan Abdulhamid II for centralizing power and surrounding himself with 
“dishonest men.” Clearly, Barkatullah’s loyalties in Constantinople did not lie with the Sultan or 
his ministers and advisors. 
    The expanding scope of Barkatullah’s foreign policy and his internationalism are 
illustrated most clearly by his critical analysis of the British invasion of Lhasa, Tibet in 1904 in 
the Forum, another influential mainstream American magazine. Barkatullah attempted to expose 
the “real” reasons for British interests in Tibet. While the two main reasons given by the British 
for their actions were that a) the Tibetan government had rejected a letter from the Viceroy of 
India and was, instead, developing closer relations with Russia, and b) the Tibetan authorities 
had not followed through with their commitments in accordance with commercial conventions 
made in 1890 and 1893. Barkatullah argues that this was just the pretense, while the real reasons 
were greed. The British were interested in the discovery of substantial mineral wealth found in 
South-West Tibet, gold in particular. With Russian attention and military resources directed 
towards China with the onset of the Russo-Japanese war months earlier, the British took 
advantage.  
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While exposing British greed and militarism was the main agenda of this article, 
Barkatullah has another concern to highlight: the importance of religion. He begins the article by 
describing Lhasa as “that holy city of the Buddhistic world,” that had been free from foreign 
invasion for centuries.
101
 The British, therefore, had violated the sacredness of this holy Buddhist 
space. He goes back to this issue later in his piece arguing that religion remains important for the 
‘East’, and warns “those who violate the sanctity of religion doubtless tread upon thin ice.”102 He 
cites the Indian Mutiny in 1857, which resulted, in part, from retaliation by the mutineers to 
being forced to use cartridges greased in the fat of cows and pigs, as an example of how 
dangerous it can be for European powers to ignore religious sensibilities. While the Ottoman 
Empire and the position of Caliph are absent in this article, Barkatullah’s message is clear: 
religious institutions and symbols matter. 
While Barkatullah was in the United States writing these articles as an intellectual having 
moved from Britain, he was not the typical Indian immigrant in America. Barkatullah had 
arrived into New York at a time of great demographic and societal change. Thousands of Indian 
migrants had moved to the Canada and the United Stated in the first two decades of the 20
th
 
century. Prior to this period, the Indian presence on American soil was relatively insignificant. 
The labor shortage resulting from the end of the Atlantic slave trade in the mid-19
th
 century had 
been replaced by mass migration of indentured colonial workers from India to British colonies 
across the world, like the Caribbean and the north coast of South America.
103
 Exploitative 
economic policies in the second half of the 19
th
 century had left Indian peasants from Punjab 
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with no choice other than to join the British army or move abroad for work to avoid poverty. 
Indebted to moneylenders along with heavy taxation and the fragmentation of landholdings 
meant agricultural workers in Punjab began to look for work outside India. Those who joined the 
military saw little monetary reward for dangerous employment. Many began to move to East and 
South East Asia like the Philippines, Malaya, Penang, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Yet, after 
hearing about the opportunities available in North America, the “attraction of earning more and 
bettering their lives drew” Punjabi laborers and army veterans, predominantly Sikh, moved to the 
United States and Canada.
104
 Parallel to the thousands of economic migrants, there was an influx 
of Bengali and Punjabi intellectuals to the East and West Coast of North America, escaping 
heightened repression by British authorities. There was also a growing number of Indian students 
moving to the United States for a better education.  
Aside from his interactions with Indian activists, socialists and new thought figures, 
Barkatullah would also come into contact with a cosmopolitan array of nationalist intellectuals 
and revolutionaries in the United States from around the world. As Emily Brown notes in her 
autobiography of Barkatullah’s close associate Har Dayal, that there were Irish, Russian, Polish 
and Mexican revolutionaries working to “overthrow the governments in their respective 
countries,” without any legislation to indict them.105 This productive space was to prove 
transformative for Barkatullah, and it was the radical Indian and Irish nationalists that 
Barkatullah began to work most closely with in the United States, through his base in New York 
City. 
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Michael Silvestri’s Ireland and India: Nationalism, Empire and Memory explores the 
various stages of contacts between Indian and Irish nationalists and anti-colonial revolutionaries 
in the early 20
th
 century. Considering the range of ideological perspectives within both the Indian 
and Irish nationalist movements, their partnerships tended to align along what they were striving 
towards. The United States provided an ideal space for some of these interactions. Barkatullah’s 
collaboration was with the radical Irish nationalists. Unlike radical Indian nationalists, their Irish 
counterparts had long been established in American politics and society. This meant Indian 
nationalists like Barkatullah, without the financial resources and established institutional 
capacity, were initially dependent on Irish-American revolutionary organizations.
106
  
Muhammad Barkatullah’s closest Irish partners were John Devoy and George Freeman. 
Devoy was an Irish-American nationalist, under whose leadership the radical Fenian 
organization Clan na Gael had become the most powerful Irish republican organization.
107
 The 
Gaelic American newspaper, owned by Devoy, would consistently attack British colonialism in 
and outside Ireland, and events India registered high on their radar. They also reprinted articles 
from Indian newspapers and gave support for Indian nationalists to publish in the US. Taraknath 
Das, for instance, began publishing his anti-British newspaper Free Hindustan using the Gaelic 
American press. In October 1906, Barkatullah and his fellow Indian nationalist Samuel Lucas 
Joshi established the Pan-Aryan Association with the help of Freeman and Devoy. The official 
aim of the organization was to “bring India and America into closer contact and to be helpful to 
students from India…the association started their anti-British propaganda,” alongside calling for 
Hindu- Muslim unity, something he seems to have maintained throughout his life and was 
                                                     
106
 Michael Silvestri, Ireland and India, 24. 
 
107
 Ibid, 19. 
 
 42 
embodied through his friendships.
108
 The Pan-Aryan Association also called for the “formation 
of a league between the peoples of Ireland and India for the overthrow of British rule.”109  
While the Indian-Irish connection has not been entirely overlooked, it has certainly been 
underplayed in scholarship thus far on the movement. For instance, as Silvestri suggests, while 
the series of plots to ignite a rebellion in British India during WWI are often referred to as the 
‘Hindu-German conspiracy’, the “historian Matthew Erin Plowman has argued, ‘Irish-Indo-
German Conspiracy’ is [a more] appropriate label for these plots to overthrow the British 
Raj.”110 Barkatullah, then working with the Germans in Europe, played a crucial role 
coordinating with, among others, George Freeman and Larry de Lacy, from the Clan na Gael 
who was an associate of Devoy’s.  
While it is clear that these connections formed in the United States with Irish nationalists 
served Barkatullah and Ghadar well in the future, their impact during his time in the United 
States may have gone further than just being crucial collaborators. The Irish-American Fenians 
had a much longer, and established record of using violent means against the British for 
independence. Devoy himself was jailed for his involvement in the failed Rebellion of 1867 by 
the Fenian Brotherhood, the precursor to Clan na Gael, that had come off the back of failed 
attempts by them to invade Canada in an attempt to put pressure on the British to leave Ireland. 
Working in close-proximity with Devoy and Freeman in the United States must have played a 
part in convincing Barkatullah and other Indian nationalists from Ghadar that using violence to 
achieve independence was a realistic and, arguably, the only means. Barkatullah’s collaborations 
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with the Irish during WWI also highlight how connections once created, do not become any less 
significant with a move. Improvements in communications, print press and steamship technology 
meant geographic barriers were easier to overcome for the network. These revolutionaries 
operated in nodes of a network that were by no means hermetically sealed spaces. 
 The United States had been a safe haven for revolutionary nationalists, but the Indian 
nationalists were to come under increased scrutiny. As Seema Sohi points out, by the beginning 
of 1906, a “British surveillance apparatus” emerged, following “Indian radicals as they moved 
across the globe, settling intermittently in cities like Paris and Tokyo in search for safe havens to 
organize outside imperial reach.”111 This surveillance apparatus had “extended its reach in North 
America with the cooperation of US and Canadian immigration officials.”112 British officials 
began to disrupt the North American network of Indian radicals by using American and 
Canadian immigration laws to deport those residing there or rejecting entry to those suspected of 
harboring anti-British tendencies.  
The surveillance wasn’t the only concern for Indian immigrants living in the US. There 
were growing anti-Indian immigration conversations taking place across North America at this 
time. As officials began to limit Indian immigration into the countries, there was also a rise in 
“anti-Hindoo” racism. The organized manifestation of this hostility came in the shape of white 
labor groups who saw Asian migrants –initially the Japanese and Chinese, followed by the most 
recent immigrant group, the Indians- as a threat to their livelihood. The hostility and 
conversations surrounding their exclusion were racialized, and it was soon to get worse. On 
September 5th 1907, the first outbreak of mob violence against Indians broke out in Bellingham, 
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Washington, where Indian mill workers were beaten by white mobs. Two days later Vancouver 
erupted in a race riot, targeting Chinatown and Japantown, partly fueled by rumors of large 
number of Indians would be arriving from Bellingham, fleeing the riots there. Due to British 
trepidation at Indian anger, Canada passed restrictive immigration legislation that, while it 
directly impacted Indians, did not explicitly target them on racial grounds. The United States, on 
the other hand, began to manipulate the “public charge” clause from 1909 to limit Indian entry 
into the US. The combination of the riots and the exclusionary immigration policies by Canada 
and the United States “politicized thousands of Indians on the Pacific Coast, who began drawing 
explicit links between racial discrimination in North America and colonial subjugation in 
India.”113  
If, in this moment, the environment politicized “thousands of Indians” who had, 
presumably, not been overtly “political”, having moved to the North America as economic 
migrants, what effect would it have had on someone entrenched in the world of anti-colonial 
politics or someone who was working in close proximity with radical Irish-American Fenians? In 
1909, according to secret British intelligence reports, “reliable information” alleged that 
“Freeman, S.L. Joshi and Barkatullah used to meet twice a week at Barakatullah’s house to 
discuss” anti-British activities.114 It is clear that Barkatullah’s had moved towards being an 
intellectual who had become increasingly involved in radical activities with Indian and Irish 
activists. His shift from being interested in the work of the Irish Home Rule moment in the UK, 
to being closely associated with Irish-American Fenians in the United States illustrates his shift 
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towards more radical politics.
115
 While this radicalization in his politics seems clear, it is 
important to note that these interactions with Irish-American Fenians did not mean Barkatullah 
had given up on attempts to portray Islam as a universal World Religion to theosophists, 
unitarians and liberal Christians. For instance, Barkatullah, considered one of the most influential 
and erudite Muslim thinkers residing in the United States, was invited to the “Fourth 
International Congress of Religious Liberals” held in Boston between September 22-27 1907 to 
give a lecture entitled “Liberal Mohammedanism in India.” Barkatullah argues in this lecture that 
Islam is a peaceful, spiritual religion that  believes in brotherly harmony with all other faiths of 
the world.
116
 As this shows, Barkatullah was experimenting with a variety of strategies that 
involved a constellation of, often overlapping, networks simultaneously. 
Barkatullah’s “seditious” writings in Tokyo, following his departure from New York, 
signaled a clear intensification in his radicalism. 
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CHAPTER V 
BARKATULLAH IN TOKYO: THE ANTI-BRITISH PROPOGANDIST 
 
The Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war had been widely seen as representing the 
victory of a ‘yellow race’ against a ‘white race.’ While Ethiopia under Menelik II had defeated 
the Italians almost a decade earlier in the Battle of Adwa in 1896, 1905 was a truly global 
moment. Seen as the first major defeat of a ‘white’ superpower by a ‘non-white’ one was 
symbolic in that it represented the perfect rebuttal of white supremacy.
117
 It not only “energized 
and strengthened” anticolonial nationalists, but it also provided an alternative model for 
modernity: a model was interpreted by many to mean that non-Western religion, language and 
culture were not seen as obstacles for progress.
 118
 While students and activists from around the 
non-Western world began to move to Japan to learn the “secrets” of their success, some like 
Barkatullah, sought to establish Tokyo as another Pan-Islamic, anticolonial Indian nationalist 
hub, with their connections with Japanese Pan-Asianists.
119
  
In January 1904, almost a month before the war had begun and five years before moving 
to Tokyo, Barkatullah wrote an article from his base in New York examining why impending 
                                                     
117
 For more on the 1905 “moment,” see Cemil Aydin’s “A Global Anti-Western Moment? The Russo-Japanese 
War, Decolonization and Asian Modernity” in Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and 
Movements, 1880s—1930s, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (New York: Palgrave, 2007). 
 
118
 Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia, 79. 
 
119
 For more on Pan-Asianism literature outside of Cemil Aydin's Politics of Anti-Westernism, see Eri Hotta, Pan-
Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) and Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and 
Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham, Maryland.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).  
 
 47 
conflict between these two great powers was inevitable.
120
 The incredible and sudden rise of 
Japan as an industrial and military power had been accompanied by an awareness of the ‘White 
Peril,’ or European colonial interest in the region. China had been humiliated by the British, “a 
most Christian nation,” in the Opium Wars had been the first warning among many for Japan to 
not only become a military superpower, but to establish a united bloc by the “unification and 
regeneration of the entire yellow family, comprising [the] Chinese, Japanese, and [the] 
[K]oreans.”121 This meant the establishment of a “Mongolian system” for all of the ‘Mongolian 
race,’ with Tokyo as the metropole of this Asian Empire. In many ways, this vision of “Pan-
Mongolianism” (or Pan-Asianism) can be seen in similar ways to Barkatullah’s vision of the 
Ottoman Empire being a Pan-Islamic empire. While Barkatullah did acknowledge that Japan was 
in an alliance with Great Britain, he argued that the British did not have the “slightest intention 
of helping her ally” and has, in fact, “resolved to conquer [Tibet] while Russia and Japan are at 
loggerheads in the Far East” along with taking advantage of the “situation in the Near East by 
bringing under her direct control the tribal states of Southern Arabia  and the Persian Gulf.”122 
Hence, even in this situation when they were allied with the power Barkatullah sided with, the 
British could not be trusted and their intentions had to be scrutinized.  
Not only was Japan firmly on the radar for Barkatullah and other Indian activists by 
1904, they had also begun making overtures to Japanese officials and Pan-Asianists before he 
moved to Tokyo in 1909. In the euphoric mood in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese 
victory over Russia, with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth which formally ended the war 
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in September 1905, Barkatullah and others of the Hindustanee Progressive Association of New 
York City (HPA) congratulated the Baron Kaneko Kentaro, the Japanese government’s special 
envoy tasked with enlisting President Theodore Roosevelt’s help in brokering a peace deal with 
Russia. An address by the HPA, signed by their President Barkatullah among others, stated their 
admiration for the Meiji Emperor Mikado Mutsuhito in securing the East from the villainous 
West, by claiming:  
 
Through his majesty’s goodness of heart Buddhism triumphs over Christianity, and through his 
majesty’s wisdom the Orient has become secure in the future from perennial wanton incursions 
of the free-booters of the West, the wagging of evil tongues and the murmuring of evil minds 
notwithstanding.
123
  
 
In many ways, the Japanese had overcome the same racism and bigotry at the hands of the 
Christian West that Barkatullah and other colonized figures wanted to defeat themselves. In the 
wake of the Russo-Japanese war, Japan was not just a symbol of non-white defiance for 
Barkatullah, but a non-Christian outside of Europe that could provide another fruitful avenue for 
anti-British agitation: both in terms of becoming a powerful ally and by giving space to anti-
colonial activists to organize. 
Barkatullah’s apologetic and romanticized attitude towards the two non-white empires, 
the Ottoman and the Japanese, does suggest his positions on empire and colonialism were 
ambivalent. In all likelihood, facing the threat of European colonialism and white supremacy had 
meant support of any empires that could potentially resist Western domination was a necessary 
evil. As Maia Ramnath argues, “the Ghadarites were pragmatists, not dogmatists; activists above 
all, not systematic armchair theorists.”124 That is not to say that Barkatullah lacked conviction in 
his principles or ideas, however. He genuinely believed in racial, religious, and economic 
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equality, for instance, despite turning a blind eye to Japanese atrocities due to the immediacy of 
geopolitics. While he supported Japanese colonial ambitions and criticized nationalist uprisings 
in Ottoman territories, a holistic reading of his writings does suggest his belief that a system that 
is representative of everyone in society was ideal. One of his most consistent critiques of Sultan 
Abdulhamid II, for instance, was that he had become increasingly autocratic and had not 
introduced any democratic reforms. Although, one could argue that had more to do with 
Barkatullah’s belief that the Ottoman Empire under the Sultan was unable to compete the 
European empires and supported his rivals. Whether empire was incompatible with democracy is 
unclear in his writings, however his preference was for democratic governance. Both the 
egalitarian ethic and democratic principles, Barkatullah had argued, were in the Qur’an and the 
message of the Prophet Muhammad.   
Prior to moving to Japan, Barkatullah had become a prominent activist, scholar and 
public intellectual during his time in the United Kingdom and the United States. While it is clear 
that he had been on the radar of British surveillance, he only seriously began to alarm British 
officials after he relocated to Tokyo. His move to Japan clearly illustrates how crucial the 
expanding network was for Barkatullah and those advising him. It was his colleagues from the 
Pan-Aryan Association, Freeman and Joshi, and Indian nationalists in Paris, who encouraged 
him to apply for an academic post in Japan. Madame Cama and Shyamji Krishnavarma from the 
Paris network are said to have pulled “some strings” by asking R.D. Tata from the prominent 
Tata family to “secure the appointment.”125  
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After moving to Japan in 1909 to work as a Professor of Hindustani at the University of 
Tokyo, the British colonial government in India became increasingly concerned with an English-
language newspaper he began publishing in 1910 called The Islamic Fraternity. It was described 
by James Campbell Ker, a colonial civil servant in India who served as the personal assistant to 
the director of British criminal intelligence, as an “anti-British” newspaper “published by a 
Mohamedan for Mohamedans.”126 While the tone of the newspaper was considered 
“objectionable” from the outset, it wasn’t until 1912 that British officials deemed it necessary to 
prohibit its importation into British India under the Sea Customs Act of 1878.
127
 The 
recommendation to suppress The Islamic Fraternity was given by the Secretary to the 
Government of Bombay based on articles deemed to be a concerted attempt to “stir up religious 
feeling and to excite hatred and disaffection” towards the British government in India.128  
Despite the suppression of The Islamic Fraternity into India, Barkatullah continued to be 
a concern from his base in Japan, where he successful in “winning over some high-profile 
Japanese politicians” and had become friends with influential Pan-Asianists like Okawa 
Shumei.
129
 Hasan Hatano, a Pan-Asianist Japanese convert to Islam and Barkatullah’s protégé 
based in Tokyo, began to publish another newspaper called El-Islam in 1911.
130
 Soon after the 
suppression of The Islamic Fraternity, copies of El-Islam (written partly in English and partly in 
Japanese) made their way into India in 1912 and 1913 and was considered to be a continuation of 
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Barkatullah’s “anti-British campaign”131. Utilizing the now elaborate radical global network, 
other seditious pamphlets like “An Nazir-ul-Uryan,” published in Urdu, alleged to have been 
written by Barkatullah, made their way into India through Shanghai.  
Although Tokyo became an important base to spread anti-British literature and 
establishing connections in Pan-Asianist circles, he was by no means disconnected from the rest 
of the network. In 1911 he travelled to Constantinople and Cairo via St. Petersburg and Odessa. 
The trip was crucial, Ramnath argues, not only because he was able to reconnect with Europe-
based revolutionaries like Krishnavarma, but also because it “marked an intensification of 
Barakatullah’s focus on national liberation.”132  
Barkatullah’s “intensification” towards national liberation was affected by global events 
from 1911 leading up to the First World War as well. Italy invaded Ottoman Libya in September 
1911, and the news would only get worse for Barkatullah as the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) would 
weaken the Ottoman Empire even further. Reflecting on his time in Japan, Barkatullah explains 
the importance of the Italian invasion in Tripoli, and the “garbled accounts about Turkey” that 
accompanied it, in the sudden shift in editorial policy of the Islamic Fraternity. The newspaper 
felt compelled to “enter into politics” and counter the narrative, as the “misrepresentations of the 
Turks and Islam tended to undermine the cause of Islam in Japan and to create a gulf of 
misunderstanding between the Turks and their co-religionists the world over.”133   
While the nationalist struggles from inside the Ottoman Empire were seen as a blow by 
Barkatullah, the Chinese revolution of November 1911, led, in part, by the Chinese nationalist 
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and Pan-Asianist Sun Yat-Sen was viewed as a significant victory.
134
 Sun Yat-Sen and other 
Chinese nationalists had been connected with Indian and other nationalists in London, Tokyo and 
the United States. Not only was Sun Yat-Sen’s organizational structure a model for Ghadarites, 
in 1914 his party even “offered assistance to Indian struggles.”135 For anti-colonial 
revolutionaries in Ireland and India, not only did the overthrow of the Qing dynasty mark the 
establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1912, part of Sun Yat-Sen’s revolutionary rhetoric 
involved critiques of Western imperialism and a desire free China from foreign economic and 
political domination that appealed to them.
136
 The Irish-Indian-Chinese revolutionary 
connections can be summed by the title of an article published in the December 2
nd
 edition of the 
Gaelic American entitled “India Stirred by Italian Aggressions and the Chinese Revolution.”137 
In Ireland itself, the country outside India whose nationalists Barkatullah most closely 
associated with, the Home Rule Crisis followed the granting of the Irish Party’s wishes with the 
introduction of the Third Home Rule Bill in April 1912. The Ulster unionists, who were opposed 
to the granting of Home Rule, decided to create a paramilitary group, the Ulster Volunteer Force 
which was “prepared to use violence to secede from a Home Rule Ireland.”138 The Republicans, 
in response, with the “hidden hand of the Irish Republican Brotherhood,” created the Irish 
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Volunteers in the following year.
139
 Before the Home Rule Crisis “few contemporaries believed 
Ireland was on the very of revolutionary change,” argues Fearghal McGarry, however, “[t]he 
emergence of volunteer militias-which weakened British authority and transformed Irish politics 
after 1913- created revolutionary possibilities that could not have been foreseen.”140 
Finally, there were significant developments in India that had an effect on the 
radicalization of the Indian network globally. The proposed partition by the British authorities of 
the state of Bengal in 1905 was met with widespread protest and gave rise to both the non-
violent swadeshi movement and radical revolutionaries who attempted to assassinate British 
authorities with the intention of both shocking and disputing the colonial administration and 
inspiring revolutionary spirit throughout British India.
141
 As Joseph Mcquade writes, while these 
‘terrorist’ organizations were “first developed in Bengal, they quickly spread to other parts of 
India, and soon became transnational in their ambitions and areas of operations,” with the 
Ghadar party being the most significant organizations that was, in part, influenced by the violent 
Bengali organizations.
142
   
The years leading up to WWI and Barkatullah’s departure from Tokyo had been 
tumultuous. A period which saw imperial encroachment into Ottoman territories by a Western 
power, the establishment of a Chinese Republican following a revolution that overthrew the Qing 
Dynasty, heightening tension in Ireland and the influence of radical networks from Bengal. 
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By the end of Barkatullah’s time in Tokyo, he had helped establish Tokyo as an 
important node in the network.
143
 Tokyo, during his brief time there, became an important hub 
through which both revolutionaries and revolutionary literature would pass.
144
 This expanding 
network gave the revolutionaries more options, and scared the British further. Barkatullah 
himself had become more open and virulent in his anti-British writings and activities. While he 
had not joined violent revolutionary activities thus far, the British were in no doubt that he 
presented a clear threat. After increasing pressure from the British government, Barkatullah’s 
contract was not renewed at the University of Tokyo and he returned to the United States in 
1914. WWI and the Ghadar’s “echo of mutiny” was about to start sounding out.  
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CHAPTER VI 
OUTBREAK OF WWI: BARKATULLAH THE REVOLUTIONARY 
 
Barkatullah arrived back to the United States on the Hong Kong Maru on May 23
rd
 1914 
and joined the Ghadar Party with WWI on the horizon.
145
 Not long after Britain declared war 
against Germany in 1914, a US-based newspaper made a declaration of their own. The Ghadar 
Party, formed of expatriate Indian revolutionaries, declared war against the British Raj. They laid 
out clearly what was at stake for those brave revolutionaries willing to listen to the call in joining 
the revolt against their British masters: 
Salary: death 
Reward: martyrdom 
Pension: freedom 
Field of Battle: Hindustan
146
 
 
Barkatullah was a key component in the meetings leading up to the decision that the time had 
arrived for a rebellion.
147
 Now, without ambiguity, Barkatullah had become a fully-fledged 
revolutionary. 
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The decision to declare war may have been facilitated by the fact that German authorities 
may have been in contact with Ghadarites months before WWI broke out, thus preparing 
Barkatullah and the Ghadarites for when it did. Germany, for the Ghadarites, was the enemy of 
their enemy, and therefore an ally.
148
 Barkatullah and other Indian and Pan-Islamist 
revolutionaries had been in contact with German authorities with the possibility of working 
together to further their common interests. Influential German leaders had been convinced by the 
diplomat Max von Oppenheim that the British and French could be weakened by turning their 
Muslim subjects against their colonizers. Oppenheim was crucial in convincing the Ottoman 
leadership to join the Germans and declare a jihad against the British, the French and the 
Russians. 
 Barkatullah arrived in Berlin on a German passport in early 1915 and soon became an 
involved in German propaganda activities by publishing pamphlets in various languages and 
speaking to Muslim prisoners of war in Germany to fight against their colonial masters. While 
these attempts were largely unsuccessful in convincing Muslims to join the cause against the 
British en masse, the Germans still viewed Barkatullah as a formidable ally. Later in the same 
year, he was sent to Afghanistan, through Constantinople and Persia, with another Indian 
Nationalist, Raja Mahendra Pratap, to convince Amir Habibullah to help in their efforts against 
the British during the Great War. According to British intelligence, “he received the Order of the 
Majidieh,” a military Order of the Ottoman Order, “from the Sultan on the recommendation of 
Dr. Nazim Bey, the Young Turk leader” before he left Constantinople.149 While their attempts 
did not come to fruition with Habibullah, they stayed in Kabul to publish seditionist newspapers 
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and soon established the Provisional Government of India (PGI), with Barkatullah named the 
Prime Minister. The PGI was established to “create alliances with countries opposed to the 
British and, with their help, to liberate India.”150 For instance, the PGI invited the Tsar of Russia 
to break their alliance with Britain and sought help from the Republican government in China.
151
 
While many of his ambitious endeavors, like convincing Muslims loyal to the British and 
French empire to rebel against them, were largely unsuccessful, it is worth thinking about how 
Indians like Barkatullah had, in this particular historical moment, become significant 
international actors that governments like Germany invested heavily in. Barkatullah and his 
colleagues, with no state structure, military or significant funding of their own, were able to 
convince German officials that they were worth investing in. They had sold themselves as 
important cogs in a network that spread across and beyond the boundaries of the British Empire. 
The Germans were particularly interested in the opportunity to mobilize Pan-Islam against the 
British and, in that regard, Barkatullah was crucial.  
The end of WWI, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Revolution of 1917 
brought about a dramatic shift in the geopolitical landscape and for Pan-Islamists in particular. 
As Maia Ramnath points out, after the end of WWI, many Bolsheviks and Pan-Islamists 
“identified each other as important allies in the struggle against Western Imperialism, especially 
as manifest in its most advanced form, British capitalism.”152 In March 1919, a short booklet by 
Barkatullah aimed at recruiting Muslims around the world entitled Bolshevism and the Islamic 
Body Politic stated: 
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Oh Mohammedans! Listen to this divine cry. Respond to this call of liberty, equality and 
brotherhood which Brother Lenin and the Soviet Government of Russia and all eastern 
countries, we are announcing to you that the secret treaties made between the deposed Emperor 
and other States as regards the occupation of Constantinople, as well as treaties ratified by the 
dismissed Kerensky, have been annulled and torn up. The Russian Soviet, therefore, considers 
it essential that Constantinople should remain in this hand of the Muslims.
153
 
 
In June 1919, a leaflet addressed “To all Muslims of Asia” signed by Barkatullah as a 
German delegate to Afghanistan began to be circulated in Central Asia. In contrast to the 
Bolsheviks who had deposed the despotic Tsar, Barkatullah states that the “British are opposed 
to this spirit of freedom and equality and especially afraid of its spreading in Asia, particularly in 
India, where the awakening of the Indian Muslim is feared…[today] there is not as single form 
of home government which has not accepted Bolshevik methods, enthusiasm and sincerity.”154 In 
an attempt at building a revolutionary spirit, he asks Muslims to look towards his colleagues in 
the British Isles, where a “revolution of workmen and labourers is taking place. Ireland has 
separated herself from the British Empire and become independent.”155 Ireland, it seems, was 
never far away from Barkatullah’s consciousness.  
At the Baku Conference of 1920, “Soviet rhetoric explicitly called upon Muslims as such 
to play a role in the world revolution.”156 One of the main factors that attracted these 
revolutionaries, including Barkatullah, to the Bolsheviks, outside of promises of funding, arms 
and training, was the Soviet Union annulling of secret treaties signed by the Tsarist regime with 
the entente powers, and returning occupied territories of Persia.
157
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Barkatullah along with Abd Al-Rab and Obeidullah Sindhi, were the key figures involved 
in introducing the Bolsheviks to the Pan-Islamic network. For some of these Pan-Islamic figures, 
there was no contradiction between socialism and their faith and, if anything, saw connections 
between them. For many others, Moscow was an unlikely destination and the relationship was 
nothing but a pragmatic decision to ally with them at this moment. Barkatullah’s position was 
interesting in this regard. While he openly stated he was neither a Communist or a Socialist, his 
anti-colonialism and Bolshevik calls for revolution based on equality and liberty were 
compatible. And, indeed, looking back at his early writings, criticism of capitalist greed, the 
destruction of industry in India, and the treatment of the lower classes by the British were part of 
his critique of British rule well before he could have even foreseen an alliance with the 
Bolsheviks.   
In the end, none of these ventures brought any tangible results for Barkatullah and his 
fellow revolutionaries during his lifetime. Arguably, the most jarring defeat would have been the 
abolishment of the office of the caliphate by Mustapha Kemal of the newly established Turkish 
Republic on March 3, 1924.
158
 Barkatullah had played a part in the Khilafat Movement, an 
Indian movement between 1919 and 1924 that attempted to pressure the British government to 
show dignity towards the Ottoman Empire and preserve the authority of the Sultan as the 
Caliph.
159
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Not long after this monumental moment, he wrote his last major work, The Khilafet.
160
 
Similar to his earlier work, prior to becoming a fully-fledged revolutionary, Barkatullah was 
keen to emphasize how Islam, at its core, has a great civilizational heritage that is compatible 
with modernity and principles of justice and equality. What explains the crisis, as he sees it, in 
the Muslim World that culminated in the abolishment of the caliphate, is the history of despotic 
leadership since the founding of the Ottoman Dynasty. Consistent with his earlier writings, he is 
particularly scathing in his assessment of Sultan Abdulhamid’s leadership. The “centuries of 
despotism,” Barkatullah argues, has meant that “even the learned among the Muslims have lost 
the faculty to understand that Islam originally meant spiritual fraternity, social liberty, 
constitutional equality and democratic polity.”161 Barkatullah was hesitant to criticize Mustapha 
Kemal and the leaders of the Turkish republic for their decision, however, and writes: 
The destruction of the Ottoman empire was in reality identical with the abolition of the 
Khilafat. What Mustapha Kemal and the Grand National Assembly of Angora Republic have 
done, simply amounts to the accomplished fact officially. The resources of the Angora 
Republic, moreover, could not afford to maintain the dignity of the Khalifa. Viewing from this 
point of view, the whole performance without a civil war and bloodshed exhibits a great 
capacity, moral courage and frankness on the part of its authors. To abolish an institution 
hallowed with the traditions of thirteen centuries, like Khilafat, in a Muslim country requires an 
unusual amount of courage.
162
 
 
The purpose of The Khilafet was not to investigate the history of the caliphate, but rather, 
an attempt at engaging in the discussion in the global Muslim public sphere about what should be 
done now that the caliphate had been abolished. Barkatullah makes it clear what the stakes are 
for the Muslim World without Muslim unity under the leadership of a Caliph when he writes, 
                                                     
160
 Muhammad Barkatullah, The Khilafat (Dhaka: Society for Pakistan Studies, 1970). Originally published as The 
Khilafet (London: Luzac and Company Oriental Foreign Booksellers and Publishers, 1924). For secondary literature 
on this publication, see Mona Hassan, Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2016), 194-199. 
 
161
 Muhammad Barkatullah, The Khilafat, 72.  
 
162
 Ibid, 74.  
 
 61 
“we must hang together, otherwise we may be hanged separately.”163 However, Barkatullah 
argues that the the role of the Caliph had to be limited to being a spiritual leader, similar to what 
had happened to the papacy in Rome. Without a powerful Muslim empire like the Ottoman 
Empire, and with Muslim polities either being under direct or indirect domination by European 
powers, Muslim delegates had difficult decisions to make at the upcoming conference discussing 
the future of the caliphate in Cairo in the following year. Barkatullah suggested they would be 
best served refraining from electing any contemporary Muslim leader. In the end, despite who 
the next caliph might be, Barkatullah maintained right until his death the promise in, and 
necessity of, the transnational solidarity of the Muslim World and the symbolic importance of 
the institution of the caliphate. 
Barkatullah remained remarkably active in the years leading up to his death and seems to 
have been the connecting link between the Indian-based nationalists and the Comintern. In 1926, 
he met Jawaharlal Nehru through Dr. M.A. Ansari who, like Barkatullah, was a part of the 
Khilafat movement and had now become an important member of the Indian National Congress 
(INC).
164
 They discussed the need for the Comintern to participate in propaganda activities in 
India in close coordination with Indian nationalists, particularly the non-communist ones. The 
concerns of Nehru, that the Comintern propaganda strategy was causing more harm than good, 
were communicated to the Comintern by Barkatullah.
165
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Barkatullah and Nehru were to meet again, representing the Ghadar Party and Indian 
National Congress respectively, at the “Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism” 
held in Brussels in February of the following year.
166
 The conference was organized by the 
Indian anticolonial revolutionary, Virendranath Chattopadhyaya and the German politician and 
communist, Willi Munzenberg. Despite being funded by the Comintern, the conference drew 
anticolonial leaders from across 104 countries and “the deliberations consisted not of Soviet 
diktats, but rather of speeches by anticolonial nationalists” and “provided the archetype for the 
Bandung Conference convened three decades later in 1955, as well as for a series of International 
Youth Congresses and Peace Conferences along the way.”167 
He died on September 20
th
 1927, during his visit to San Francisco for Ghadar’s annual 
conference with his chronic diabetes finally catching up to him. Barkatullah was committed to 
the cause right till the end. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
As this thesis has tried to demonstrate, Barkatullah’s turn from an intellectual to a 
revolutionary was not inevitable, but “conjunctural and contingent.”168 Barkatullah went from 
being an Indian-Muslim intellectual arguing against imperial bigotry and inequality to someone 
“embracing the program of springing the imperial lock by forging transnational alliances and 
cultural diplomatic ties in the diaspora.”169 While Barkatullah had indeed become an anticolonial 
revolutionary fighting the British, like other revolutionaries in the interwar period, he tried to 
work alongside middle-ranking imperial powers like Germany, the Ottomans and the Japanese.  
While he may have been ambivalent about colonialism itself, his commitment to working 
for equality and justice remained consistent throughout his career. Barkatullah’s mode for 
achieving his goals remained consistent too: internationalism. Arguably, it was the transnational 
nature of the British Empire that meant that Indian-Muslim figures like Barkatullah would begin 
to look for solutions to imperial racism globally, by forming alliances with a dizzyingly 
cosmopolitan array of networks, individuals, states and empires. It is important to highlight, 
however, that these networks were not limited to those that were colonized.  
 Barkatullah recognized that Britain and the ‘West,’ were not homogenous. From his 
earliest days in Britain, alongside becoming a central figure in the diasporic Indian and Pan-
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Islamic networks, Barkatullah’s initial strategy was to develop relationships with British 
socialists, theosophists and liberals for “linked-up agitation” against British injustices and 
bigotry.
170
 It was precisely the fissures within, and between, Western powers what he, and others 
were trying to exploit.  
Before Barkatullah became a revolutionary, in both the United States and Britain, he not 
only developed relationships but he also tried to counter bigoted depictions of Islam, Muslim 
societies and Ottoman Empire by giving lectures and writing in newspapers and magazines. 
Barkatullah understood how deeply intertwined colonial geopolitics were with narratives relating 
to race, culture and religion in the ‘West.’ He could see, for instance, how the supposed tyranny 
and backwardness of the “terrible Turk” could be used as justification for supporting nationalist 
movements in the Ottoman Empire like the ones in Crete and the Balkans. Therefore, for 
Barkatullah, intervening in the British and American public sphere on conversations to do with 
Islam was more than just about restoring dignity to Muslims like himself. In doing so, 
Barkatullah beyond just writing Muslim apologetics and was engaged in what Tomoko 
Masuzawa calls “colonial self-articulation.”171 By presenting Islam as a liberal, egalitarian, 
modern, and universal religion he tried to show how Islam had as much to offer theosophists, 
liberal Christians, and unitarians that Islam that had as much to offer to the West as Hinduism 
and Buddhism did. 
Barkatullah’s decision to become an anti-British revolutionary when WWI began meant 
that it was the rivalry and diverging interests between the British and various empires and states 
that became the focus for him. Even then, however, Barkatullah never lost sight of the 
importance of staying engaged in the public sphere, although his attention seemed to be focused 
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primarily on Indians and Muslims across the world.  
In the end, Barkatullah died before he was able to see a post-colonial South Asia. 
Although he also missed out on experiencing the trauma of partition that accompanied it. Having 
worked closely alongside Hindu, Sikh and Parsi Indian revolutionary brothers and sisters, 
Barkatullah may not be able to recognize South Asia today where Hindu and Muslim are often 
spoken about from the far-right edges as being natural enemies. His cosmopolitan, inclusive and 
egalitarian form of Pan-Islam, the most enduring part of his ideological identity, does not square 
with the Pan-Islamism that came back into global consciousness in the 1980s and is now widely 
seen as inherently violent and destructive. Excavating and recollecting the imaginations, 
activities and connections from Barkatullah’s life seem as timely as ever of how things were, and 
could be, different. 
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